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and Barbara Kohl Reports appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES and elsewhere in the last 10 days
indicate that a major power struggle within contra ranks is again brewing. (See "FDN Reveals 1987
Strategy; Resurgence of Power Struggle Within Contra Ranks Evident," CAU 01/23/87, and "Cruz
Ready to Resign; Says FDN & CIA Obstruct Process of Bringing Military Under Civilian Control,"
this issue.) Disagreements between Arturo Cruz, leader of the United Nicaraguan Opposition
(UNO), and Alfonso Calero, head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), are long-standing, and
reflect different visions of how Nicaraguan society "should be" organized after the Sandinistas are
eventually deposed. The FDN, the contras' main army, was formed by the CIA in 1981. In contrast,
UNO was established in 1985 largely at the behest of the US State Department, in an attempt to
"clean up" the contras' image, i.e., make them more palatable to the US public and Congress. The
major aims of this whitewashing campaign were to bring unity to numerous contra groups who
often spent time and resources fighting each other instead of the Sandinistas; establish a political-
diplomatic program and leadership for the contra military effort; and, to reduce or eliminate certain
"embarrassing" practices by the contras, including a variety of human rights abuses perpetrated
against Nicaraguan civilians and even contra troops who dared question the leadership, drug
and arms trafficking, and the misuse of US funding. In the following, we discuss the origins and
perspectives of the UNO and FDN leadership, and CIA vis-a-vis State Department proclivities
in the struggle to oust the Sandinista government. A comparison with the historical record on
the Cuban counter-revolutionary movement reveals that the contra leadership split and State
Department-CIA differences on how the Nicaraguan contras should proceed are hardly novel.
A significant number of UNO leaders derive from middle class sectors who fought against the
dictator Anastasio Somoza and believed that a social revolution in Nicaragua was necessary. In
general, they favored a "democratic social revolution," which in practice would consist of reforms
such as a representative parliamentary form of government, more equitable distribution of land
and income, and programs to reduce unemployment and abject poverty. Arturo Cruz and Alfonso
Robelo represent leaders of this kind. Both former Sandinistas, they turned against the government
in Managua because they believed the revolution had become too radical and "communist." In
other words, Cruz and Robelo identify with the "revolution betrayed" thesis. (The same thesis
has been used consistently by the State Department in justifying continued aid to the contras.)
UNO was established as a political facade to justify the Reagan administration's policy toward
Nicaragua before Congress, the American public, and world opinion. Meanwhile, the "politicians"
Cruz and Robelo still lack a political organization or independent social base inside Nicaragua.
Despite this fundamental "problem" one shared with the FDN the UNO leadership have obtained
support from the State Department to gain control over the contra movement. Cruz and Robelo
do not enjoy control over a military force on the ground. On the other hand, FDN leaders such
as Arturo Calero are opposed to any manner of social revolution in Nicaragua. Allied with the
Somoza regime, they opposed the Sandinistas before, during and after the revolution. FDN leaders
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do not adhere to the notion of a "revolution betrayed." Rather, from their perspective, the major
difference between Cruz/Robelo and the Sandinistas is that the former are willing to "communize"
Nicaragua at a slower pace. Consequently, the FDN does not trust the UNO leadership. The FDN
leadership has a monopoly over contra military resources. They believe that political power is
not ultimately a function of declared ideology or political programs, but devolves from military
prowess. As a result, the FDN does not share the UNO leadership's political and programmatic
perspectives, and is thereby unwilling to release its monopoly of military capabilities. Many CIA
agents apparently find themselves much more comfortable with the FDN than with UNO. This
"compatibility" is not surprising, nor is it unprecedented. The historical record on CIA plans and
actions to undermine the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba provides ample evidence of Agency
preferences. In 1961 the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRP), the largest counter-
revolutionary organization inside Cuba at the time, was NOT informed about the date (much less
hour) of the CIA-organized Bay of Pigs invasion. When the military invasion occurred, the MRP
was taken by surprise. Why did the CIA leave the Cuban underground in the dark? The MRP, an
urban underground group headed by Manolo Ray, adhered to a "revolution betrayed" thesis. For
both the leadership of the Cuban exile Brigade dominated by "Batistianos" or supporters of deposed
dictator Fulgencio Batista , and the CIA, Ray's underground was perceived as "too leftist," and
perhaps even an instrument of the Communists. In fact, the Movimiento was denounced by the
CIA and the rightwing Cuban exiles as "Fidelistas sin Fidel." Thus, CIA operatives were willing
to risk failure of the Bay of Pigs expedition rather than inform the social democratic anti-Castro
movement of their plans. The CIA feared the MRP rather than the Batistianos would seize power.
The State Department wished to provide greater support to the MRP, but the CIA was in charge of
counter-revolutionary operations. Only very rightwing opponents of the Cuban revolution were
to be trusted. In the end Manolo Ray and his supporters tried to go it alone, and broke with the
rightwing counter-revolutionaries. Returning to the Nicaraguan contra situation, the FDN wants
to overthrow the Sandinistas but not in a manner that would permit UNO leaders to take control
of political power. The FDN has referred to UNO as "Sandinistas without Daniel Ortega." Cruz/
Robelo are isolated by every means possible while their very presence within the contra movement
is exploited to the maximum as a means of hiding the real objectives of the CIA's favorite sons, or
the FDN. Manolo Ray's disappointed revolutionaries broke with the Batistianos. A similar pattern
within the Nicaraguan counter- revolutionary movement appears to be underway. The Democratic
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), under the leadership of Eden Pastora ("Commander Zero"), has
already dropped out. The charismatic Pastora fought against the Somoza regime, and was honored
as a Sandinista war hero when the revolution triumphed in 1979. Later when he took up arms
against the Sandinista government, Pastora became known for his ambivalence about cooperating
with former Somocista guardsmen in the FDN. The CIA labeled him as difficult to control. The UNO
"moderates" Cruz, Robelo, et al. may soon opt for breaking with the FDN and going it alone as well.
[Nelson Valdes teaches sociology at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, and is director
of the Latin America Database (LADB). Barbara Kohl is managing editor of the UPDATE and the
CHRONICLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, both publications of the LADB.]
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